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Abstract
Do hedging and speculative activity in commodity futures a¤ect spot prices? Yes,
when commodity producers have hedging needs. We build a model in which produc-
ers are risk-averse to future cash ow variability and hedge using futures contracts.
Increases in speculative demand for futures reduces the cost of hedging, allowing pro-
ducers to hedge more and hold larger inventories. This pushes spot prices higher.
Reductions in speculative demand for futures have the opposite e¤ects. The data
provide support for the hedging channel we identify  oil and gas producers hedg-
ing demands (proxied by their default risk), forecast spot prices, futures prices and
producersinventories.
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1 Introduction
Merton H. Miller in a conversation with the treasurer of a medium-sized oil
company in Chicago who bemoaned his companys losses when the Gulf wars end
brought down the price of oil: "It serves you right for speculating and gambling,"
Miller told him. "Oh, no, we didnt speculate. We didnt use the futures market
at all," insisted the treasurer. "Thats exactly the point," Miller replied. "When
you hold inventory, non-hedging is gambling. You gambled that the price of oil
would not drop and you lost."
From the book Merton Miller on Derivatives (John Wiley & Sons, 1997).
Commodity futures have been amongst the most successful hedging instruments avail-
able in modern nancial markets. The relatively large volume of trading in these futures
is generally considered a manifestation of the signicant hedging demand in the economy
from commodity producers and consumers.1 However, in the recent past, the behavior of
commodity prices has raised several questions concerning the role of speculative and hedg-
ing activities in commodity markets. Between 2003 and June 2008, energy, base metals, and
precious metals experienced price rises in excess of 100%, and agricultural and livestock com-
modities experienced much higher price rises than would be implied by ination. Over the
same period, there was a huge increase in the amount of capital committed to long positions
in commodity futures contracts in July 2008, pension funds and other large institutions
were reportedly holding over $250 billion in commodities (mostly invested through indices
such as the S&P GSCI) compared to their $10 billion holding in 2000 (Financial Times, July
8 2008).
Some market practitioners and economists have vehemently argued that the speculative
investments of nancial players in the futures market are not direct determinants of the
real (or spot") price of commodities, rather, spot prices are set by those agents in the
economy who are buying and selling the underlying commodities. According to this view,
the spectacular recent increase in commodity spot prices is a manifestation of increases
in global demand arising from high growth rates in countries such as China and India.
Other commentators (most notably, Michael Masters, a hedge-fund manager, and George
Soros, who both testied to the US Congress) have blamed speculative activity for these
1In contrast, the usage of derivatives to hedge in other industrial rms has as of yet been limited (Guay
and Kothari, 2003).
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recent commodity price rises. A third group (one that includes former Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan) has taken an intermediate view that commodity spot prices
are fundamentally driven by physical demand, but that nancial speculation has played
some role in recent price rises. This last set of commentators has also argued that nancial
speculation is in fact stabilizing: the long positions taken by nancial investors have enabled
producers to take short hedging positions, hold larger inventories, and simultaneously pursue
new acquisitions of commodities, which should stabilize prices going forward.2
This recent debate raises several important questions. Through what channels, if any,
might speculative and hedging activity in commodity futures a¤ect spot prices? Is there any
direct evidence supportive of these channels? Can the variation in speculative and hedging
demands explain both spot and futures price behavior in commodity markets? Is an increase
in speculative activity necessarily welfare-reducing, or might it have some stabilizing impacts
on the behavior of inventory and on production decisions?
In this paper, we provide a simple model to answer some of these questions, and present
empirical evidence consistent with the models predictions. Our focus in the model is on
understanding the implications of varying the degree of risk-sharing between producers and
speculators. The model incorporates elements from Anderson and Danthine (1981, 1983) and
Deaton and Laroque (1992) we analyze the interaction between risk-averse producers, who
optimally manage inventory and hedge future supply commitments by shorting futures,3 and
risk-averse speculators, who take long positions in futures. The model thus nests the two
classical explanations for commodity spot and futures prices: The Theory of Storage (Kaldor
(1936), Working (1949), and Brennan (1958)), which has optimal inventory management as a
main determinant of commodity prices, and the Theory of Normal Backwardation (Keynes
(1930)), which posits that hedging pressure a¤ects commodity futures prices. We clear
markets for futures and spot commodities (assuming exogenous spot demand functions) and
derive implications of producer and speculator risk aversion for the relative levels of futures
and spot prices.
We show that when producersrisk-aversion goes up, their hedging demand increases and
futures risk-premium the hedging pressure on futures prices increases. Correspondingly,
2Greenspan says good speculationwill cut the top o¤market peak, Financial Times, August 11 2008.
3The Appendix presents a version of the hedging model of Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), which
is based on the assumption of costly external nance when rms face cash shortfalls for nancing growth
options. This extension of our benchmark model provides a micro-foundation for producer risk-aversion",
and also allows us to link speculative and hedging demands to future production decisions. Early papers on
hedging by rms include Stulz (1984) and Smith and Stulz (1985).
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their holdings of inventory fall, causing spot prices to rise. Conversely, if speculator risk-
aversion goes up, producers nd it cheaper to hedge, so their equilibrium hedging rises (as
do inventories), spot prices fall, and the futures risk-premium declines. These results imply
that when producers are risk-averse and have hedging demands, speculative activity arising
from changes in speculatorsrisk appetites can a¤ect spot prices. This is because speculative
activity directly impacts the cost to producers of hedging, and concomitantly, the willingness
of producers to hold inventories rather than to sell them in the spot market.
Our results provide a consistent, if partial, explanation for the recent gyrations in com-
modity prices. The increased allocation to commodities in nancial institutionsportfolios
made it cheaper for producers to hedge, allowing them to carry larger inventories, which
raised spot prices. The fallout of the sub-prime crisis in 2008, however, increased specula-
tor risk-aversion and simultaneously raised producer default risk. This increased producer
hedging demand at the same time that it became costlier to hedge, causing inventories to
fall and lowering spot prices. We acknowledge that our theory, which is based on increased
risk-sharing between producers and speculators, is unlikely to explain the full magnitude of
the rise and fall in oil prices. Rather than a complete explanation, we view the mechanism
we have outlined as a likely contributing factor to recent price movements. Other potential
contributing factors to the observed price pattern include shifts in global demand, and the
possibility of a bubble in commodity prices that collapsed in the summer of 2008.
We test the models predictions, assuming that producers risk-aversion and hedging
demand increase in their default risk. Default risk may increase the deadweight costs of
external nance, one rationale for hedging, as argued by Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993).
An alternative channel through which default risk may drive hedging demand is manager-
ial aversion to turnover, with turnover higher in rms with high leverage and deteriorating
performance (see, for example, Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Warner et al. (1988), Weis-
bach (1988) and Gilson (1989)). We nd that time-series uctuations in the default risk
of commodity producers help to explain the time-series variation in hedging demand and
commodity spot and futures prices. Our empirical methods stand in contrast to the extant
empirical work which has employed outcomes - such as inventories and hedging demand -
rather than the primitive - the default risk itself, in order to explain commodity spot and fu-
tures prices. Indeed, we show that the inventories and observed futures positions of hedgers
are themselves explained by variation in the default risk of producers.
In our tests, we focus on four commodities heating oil, crude oil, gasoline and natural
gas. Our choice of these commodities is partly driven by data requirement that we have
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at least ten producers in each quarter to produce an average measure of default risk for a
given commodity, and partly by the fact that these are the largest commodity markets. We
employ both balance sheet based measures of default risk the Zmijewski-score (Zmijewski
(1984)), as well as market based measures the past three year stock return (Gilson (1989)),
and the naive" expected default frequency (EDF) which approximates Moody KMVs EDF
(Bharath and Shumway, 2008). We show that these measures of the default risk of oil and
gas producers are related to spot and futures prices and inventories in a manner that is
consistent with our model.
First, an increase in the default risk of producers forecasts an increase in excess returns
on short-term futures of these commodities. The e¤ect is robust to business-cycle conditions
and economically signicant: a one standard deviation increase in the aggregate commodity
sector default risk is on average associated with a 3% increase in the respective commoditys
futuresrisk premium. Second, as producer default risk increases, our model implies that
producers will hold more inventory, pushing up spot prices. This prediction is conrmed in
the data increases in the default risk of oil and gas producers in a quarter predicts higher
spot returns in the subsequent quarter.4 Third, default risk positively forecasts hedging
demand as measured by the net short positions of market participants classied as hedgers
by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Fourth, default risk of producers
negatively forecasts inventory holdings. These ndings conrms our prediction that increases
in producer default risk imply increases in futures risk premia and spot returns through the
mechanism we identify in our model.
We do not explicitly conrm the role of speculative activity in a¤ecting commodity mar-
kets. This is mainly owing to the empirical limitation that signicant uctuations in specu-
lative activity have been observed primarily in recent years lending less statistical power
to any such analysis. The results of our empirical tests that employ measures of producer
risk-aversion conrm the predictions of our model, and suggest that future investigations
employing measures of speculator risk aversion would yield interesting results
At a fundamental level, our model and its results can be understood in terms of the role
of contingent claims when markets are incomplete. In the standard Arrow-Debreu model
with complete markets (Debreu (1959)), introducing redundant securities such as contingent
claims has no e¤ect on prices of existing assets. Though this simple paradigm is still the
4Put together, our rst and second ndings imply that both futures risk premia and spot returns have a
common driver the hedging demand of producers. This suggests that the default risk of producers should
not explain the convenience yield or basis on the commodity very well. This is veried in the data (these
results are available upon request).
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basis for pricing of many contingent claims, including futures and options, commodities
markets do not t naturally in this paradigm for two main reasons. First, commodity
markets are segmented in the sense that producers are the only economic agents that can
adjust spot inventories with relative ease. In particular, speculators wishing to express their
views on commodity prices can really only do so in the futures markets. One implication
of this restriction is that futures prices might play the information aggregation role that
spot prices do in other markets generating one channel via which futures prices may a¤ect
spot prices. Another implication is that arbitrage" between spot and futures markets is
relatively costless only for commodity producers.
Second, another (perhaps deeper) form of market incompleteness arises from the inability
of commodity producers to fully hedge future demand and production shocks. In such an
incomplete markets setting, the introduction (or change in supply) of a contingent claim
such as futures or options can improve risk-sharing in the economy and alter spot prices
(see, for example, Detemple and Selden (1991)). In the specic context of commodities,
futures a¤ect the relative ease or cost of hedging by producers and thereby also a¤ect their
inventory holdings and production schedules, which in turn a¤ects spot prices. Litzenberger
and Rabinowitz (1995) link futures markets and prices to commodity production and provide
empirical support for this channel using oil data. Our paper focuses more directly on the
e¤ect of the futures market on hedging by commodity producers, and its attendant impacts
on inventories and spot prices.
The organization of the paper is as follows. The remainder of the introduction relates
our paper to previous literature. Section 2 introduces our model. Section 3 presents the
data we employ in our empirical tests. Section 4 presents and discusses the results from our
empirical estimation, and Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
There are two classic views on the behavior of commodity forward prices. The Theory
of Normal Backwardation, put forth by Keynes (1930), states that speculators, who take
the long side of a commodity future position, require a risk premium for hedging the spot
price exposure of producers. The risk premium on long forward positions is thus increas-
ing in the amount of hedging pressure and should be related to observed hedger versus
speculator positions in the commodity forward markets. Bessembinder (1992) and De Roon,
Nijman and Veld (2000) empirically link hedging pressure to futures excess returns, basis and
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the convenience yield and interpret their ndings as consistent with the Theory of Normal
Backwardation. The Theory of Storage (e.g., Kaldor (1936), Working (1949), and Brennan
(1958)), on the other hand, postulates that forward prices are driven by optimal inventory
management. In particular, the Theory of Storage introduces the notion of a "convenience"
yield to explain why anyone would hold inventory in periods of expected decline of spot
prices. Tests of the Theory of Storage include Fama and French (1988) and Ng and Pirrong
(1994).
In more recent work, Routledge, Seppi and Spatt (2000) introduce a forward market in
the optimal inventory management model of Deaton and Laroque (1992) and show that time-
varying convenience yields, consistent with those observed in the data, can arise even with
risk-neutral agents. In this case, of course, the risk premium on the commodity forwards
is zero. The convenience yield arises because the holder of the spot also implicitly holds
a timing option in terms of taking advantage of temporary spikes in the spot price. The
time-variation in the value of this option is reected in the time-variation in the observed
convenience yield. Thus, time-variation in the observed convenience yield need not be due to
a time-varying forward risk premium. Note, however, that the two theories are not mutually
exclusive. A time-varying risk premium on forwards is consistent with optimal inventory
management if producers are not risk-neutral or face, e.g., bankruptcy costs and speculator
capital is not unlimited: If producers have hedging demands (absent from the Routledge,
Seppi and Spatt model), speculators will take the opposite long positions given they are
awarded a fair risk premium on the position.
In the data, hedgers are on average net short forwards, while speculators are on average
net long, which indicates that producers on average have hedging demands. Gorton and
Rouwenhorst (2006) present evidence that long positions in commodity futures contracts on
average have earned a risk premium. It has proved di¢ cult to explain the unconditional
risk premium on commodity futures with traditional asset pricing theory (see Jagannathan,
(1985) for an earlier e¤ort). Erb and Harvey (2006) is a critical discussion of the average
returns to investing in commodity futures. Fama and French (1987) present early empirical
evidence on the properties of commodity prices and their link to the Theory of Storage.
There is a large literature on reduced form, no-arbitrage modeling of commodity futures
prices (e.g., Brennan, (1991) Schwartz (1997)). Most recently, Cassasus and Collin-Dufresne
(2004) show in a no-arbitrage latent factor a¢ ne model that the convenience yield is posi-
tively related to the spot price under the risk-neutral measure. Further, these authors shows
that the level of convenience yield is increasing in the degree to which an asset serves for
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production purposes.
In a recent paper, Gorton, Hayashi, and Rouwenhorst (2007) argue that time-varying fu-
tures risk premia are driven by inventory levels and not by net speculator or hedger positions.
In particular, they show that various denitions of hedging pressure do not signicantly fore-
cast excess long forward returns, although the signs are consistent with Keyneshypothesis.
Inventory, on the other hand, forecasts future forward returns with a negative sign in their
sample; i.e., when inventory levels are low, the forward risk premium is high. They argue
that this evidence is in favor of the Theory of Storage and that hedging pressure is not an
important determinant of commodity forward risk premiums. In addition, Gorton, Hayashi,
and Rouwenhorst show that the inventory level is negatively related to the basis, spot com-
modity price and that the relation is nonlinear in that it is stronger the lower the inventory
level. This evidence strongly supports the main features of the Theory of Storage. However,
they do not consider default risk directly. Identifying and highlighting the role of default
risk the primary underlying risk that we argue and nd drives producers to hedge using
futures contracts constitutes our most important and novel contribution.
2 The Model
In this section, we present a model of commodity spot and futures price determination that
combines both the optimal inventory management model of Deaton and Laroque (1992)
and the commodity speculation and hedging demand models of Anderson and Danthine
(1981, 1983). There are three types of agents in this model: (1) The commodity producers,
who manage prots through optimal inventory management and hedging using commodity
futures; (2) the consumers, whose demand for the spot commodity along with the equilib-
rium supply determine the commodity spot price; (3) the speculators, whose demand for
the commodity futures along with the futures hedging demand of producers determine the
commodity futures price.
Hedging demand on the part of commodity producers arises since commodity producers
are assumed to be averse to future earnings volatility. The literature on hedging demand
provides several justications for this modeling choice. Managers could be underdiversied,
as in Stulz (1984), or better informed about the factors responsible for generating rm
performance (Breeden and Viswanathan (1990), and DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1995)). Managers
could also be averse to distress (see Gilson (1989)), or there may be costs of nancial distress
to the rm (Smith and Stulz (1985)). Aversion to earnings volatility can also be viewed
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as arising from costs of external nancing as in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993). In
the Appendix, we present a slightly more complicated model which employs the Froot,
Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) framework to model hedging demand as arising from costly
external nancing.
2.1 Consumption, Production and the Spot Price
Each period ct units of the good is consumed. The production schedule is predetermined and
production each period is denoted gt. Thus, we have in mind an economy where the time and
cost required to adjust production schedules to transitory demand shocks are prohibitively
large.5 The current economy-wide inventory level of the commodity is denoted It and goods
in inventory depreciate at a rate d. Market clearing demands that incoming inventory and
current production, gt + (1  d) It 1, equals current consumption and outgoing inventory,
ct + It. This equality can be rearranged and we get:
ct = gt  It (1)
where It  It   (1  d) It 1. Let the spot price of the commodity be denoted St. We
assume the immediate use demand, ct (St; at), is monotone decreasing in the spot price St
given a level of the current demand shock, at. We summarize the spot market as follows:
St = at + f (gt  It) ; (2)
where the demand shock at has variance 2S, and f is decreasing in the supply, gt It.6 The
demand shock represents exogenous shifts in the commodity demand that are independent
of the commodity price level. A similar inverse demand function is assumed in Routledge,
Seppi, and Spatt (2000). We will in the following for simplicity of exposition, but without
loss of generality, assume that the per period depreciation rate, d = 0 and interest rate r = 0.
5We will in the empirical section consider the behavior of short-term commodity futures contracts. Ar-
guably, short-term contracts are more inuenced by inventory uctuations than shocks to longer term supply
and demand.
6We assume throughout the analysis that at and f are specied such that (a) prices are positive and (b)
a market-clearing spot price exists.
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2.2 Producers
Producers are assumed to have two concerns: (i) they want to maximize the value of current
and future earnings, but (ii) they also want to minimize the variance of next periods earnings.
The latter concern is what gives rise to a hedging demand. The timing of the managers
decisions are as follows. In period 0, the rm stores an amount I as inventory from its current
supply, g0, and so period 0 prots are simply S0 (g0   I). The rm also enters hp short
futures contracts for delivery in period 1. In period 1, the rm sells its current inventory
and production supply, honors its futures contracts and realizes a prot of S1 (I + g1) +
hp (F   S1), where F is the forward price of the futures contracts. There is an innite mass
of inventory managers normalized to one. The individual inventory manager is therefore a
price taker. The rmsproblem is then
max
fI;hg
S0 (g0   I) + E [S1 (I + g1) + hp (F   S1)] :::
  ~ap
2
V ar [S1 (I + g1) + hp (F   S1)] (3)
subject to
I  0; (4)
where ~ap governs the degree of aversion to variance in future earnings.7
Hedging Demand Case: ~ap > 0
The rst order condition of inventory holding is:
S0   E [S1] =  ~ap (I + g1   hp)2S + ; (5)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier on the inventory constraint and 2S is the price volatility of
the period 1 commodity price. If the current demand shock is su¢ ciently high, an inventory
stock-out occurs (i.e.,  > 0), and current spot prices can rise above future expected spot
prices. Firms would in this case like to have negative inventory, but cannot. This creates
predictability in the spot price and thus an observed convenience yield from holding the spot
in the sense that those who do hold the spot at time 0 get to sell at a high price. This is
the Theory of Storage aspect of the model. In a multi-period setting, a convenience yield of
holding the spot arises in these models even if there is no actual stock-out, but as long as
7In this model, E [] denotes the expectation conditional on the information set at time 0.
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there is a positive probability of a stock-out (see Routledge, Seppi, and Spatt, 2000).8
Solving for optimal investment, we have
I =
E [S1]  S0 + 
~ap2S
  g1 + hp: (6)
Thus, inventory is increasing in expected future price, decreasing in current price, and de-
creasing in the amount of extracted oil (g1). Importantly, inventory is also increasing in the
amount of oil hedged in the futures market. That is, hedging allows the producer to hold
more inventory as it reduces the amount of earnings variance the producer would otherwise
be exposed to.
The rst order condition for the number of short futures contracts is:
F   E [S1] =  ~ap (I + g1   hp)2S (7)
m
hp = I
 + g1   E [S1]  F
~ap2S
: (8)
The optimal number of short futures contracts held is one-for-one with the period one supply,
I + g1, but with a price adjustment: If the futures price is lower than the expected future
spot price, it is optimal for the producer to increase the expected prots by entering a long
speculative futures position after having fully hedged the period 1 supply. Since the inventory
manager is naturally short future oil, this case entails shorting fewer futures contracts. In
other words, since the hedge is costly it is not optimal to hedge the period 1 price exposure
fully. Increasing the producers incentive to hedge, ~ap, decreases this speculative position.
Note also that if F = E [S1] there are no gains or costs to hedging activity in terms of
expected prots and the producer will therefore simply minimize the variance of period 1
prots by hedging fully.
The Basis
Combining the rst order conditions, we have that
basis = S0   F = : (9)
8In terms of intuition with respect to practical application, where a de facto stock-out very rarely occurs,
one can think of "stock-outs" in our simple one-period model as an increase in the probability of a stock-out.
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In words, the basis only di¤ers from zero if there is a stock-out. Thus, a convenience yield can
only arise in this model through the inventory stock-out channel, as in Routledge, Seppi, and
Spatt (2000). This in turn implies that the futures risk premium and the expected change
in the spot price cancel each other out in times of no stock-out. The basis is therefore not a
good signal of the futures risk premium in this model, consistent with the ndings of Fama
and French (1986) and our empirical results to follow.
Benchmark Case: ~ap = 0
When ~ap = 0, there is no hedging incentive. From the producersrst order condition for
the number of futures contracts, we then have
F = E [S1] : (10)
Thus, the assumption of producer hedging demand is necessary for a futures risk premium
to arise in this model.
2.3 The Speculators
Speculators in the commodity market are assumed to be subject to capital constraints due
to, e.g., (expand on this and references) costs of leverage such as margin requirements, VaR
limits, and increased costs of capital in the risk exposure due to moral hazard, costs of
bankruptcy. In particular, we assume that these costs are proportional to the variance of
the speculator position. Thus, the representative speculator maximizes the gains to trading
in the commodity market subject to a penalty function that is proportional in variance:
max
hS
E [hs (S1   F )]  ~as
2
V ar [hs (S1   F )] (11)
+
hs =
E [S1]  F
~as2S
: (12)
If speculators are not subject to any frictions, ~as = 0, the market clearing futures price would
be the same as the expected spot price: F = E [P1]. In this case, there would not be a role
for hedging demand a¤ecting commodity prices, as explained above. Thus, the assumption
of speculator variance aversion is also necessary to generate uctuations in the futures risk
premium related to hedging activity in this model.
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2.4 Equilibrium
The futures contracts are in zero net supply and therefore hs = hp, in equilibrium. From
equations (8) and (12) we thus have that
(as + ap) (E [S1]  F ) = I + g1; (13)
where ap  1= (~ap2S) and as  1= (~as2S). Using the fact that S0   F = , we get
(as + ap) (E [S1 (I
)]  S0 (I) + ) = I + g1: (14)
Since I + g1 > 0, we have that E [S1]   (S0   ) > 0. We assume this relation holds
throughout our analysis. In the case of no stock-out, this implies that E [S1] > S0. When
there is a stock-out, however, current spot prices can be higher than expected future spot
prices as  in this case is greater than zero. Equation (14) gives the solution for I. Given
I and the inverse demand function in equation (2), we can calculate E [S1 (I)]. Since
F = S0 (I
)    (I), the equilibrium supply of short futures contracts can be found using
equation (8).
2.5 Model Predictions
In following, we present model predictions for the commodity inventory, spot and futures
prices as we vary exogenous parameters of interest. In particular, we look at producers
propensity to hedge, ~ap, and the degree of speculators variance aversion, ~as. Proofs of
the following Propositions are relegated to the Appendix, and we only give the economic
intuition for the results in this section.
Proposition 1 Producer Risk Aversion, ~ap: The aggregate inventory level and commod-
ity spot price are decreasing in producer risk aversion. The futures risk premium is increasing
in producer risk aversion.
[FIGURE 1 AND FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The models predictions with respect to changes in fundamental hedging demand are
summarized in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Figure 1 shows that in the case of no inventory
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stock-out, producers will tend to hold less inventory when their propensity to hedge is high.
Inventory is risky for the rm since future spot prices are uncertain. It is never optimal
for the constrained rm to fully hedge its inventory as the futures risk premium is positive
in this case, and since it therefore is costly for the rm to hedge. Increased sensitivity to
the risk of holding unhedged inventory, decreases the inventory holding in equilibrium. This
means that more of the commodity is sold on the spot market and the current spot prices are
low while future spot prices are high. Since selling the commodity in the spot market and
investing the cash is an alternative to holding an extra unit of inventory and hedging with
a short futures contract in terms of receiving a risk-less payment in the future, the return
to both of these strategies must be equal in equilibrium. This is why a high expected spot
price leads to a high futures risk premium as illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows the case
of an inventory stock-out. Now, current and future expected spot prices are constant. The
increased benet of hedging with the futures contract leads to a higher demand for short
futures contracts which can only be accommodated by increasing the futures risk premium.
In sum, the model predicts that the futures risk premium is increasing in producers
hedging demand. When there is not an inventory stock-out, increased hedging demand all
else equal leads to lower current spot prices and higher expected future spot prices. Thus,
the cost of hedging in futures markets (the futures risk premium) a¤ects the spot markets.
The same intuition holds for variations in the speculators appetite for risk.
Proposition 2 Speculator Risk Tolerance, ~a 1s : The aggregate inventory level and com-
modity spot price are increasing in speculator risk tolerance. The futures risk premium is
decreasing in speculator risk tolerance.
Increasing speculator risk tolerance decreases the futures risk premium in equilibrium as
their demand for long futures positions increases. This, in turn, makes it cheaper for the
producers to hedge their inventory, which allows them to hold more inventory. A higher
inventory level means that less of the commodity is sold in the spot market, and therefore
the spot price increases.
Since the basis (S0   F ) is constant in the case of no inventory stock-out, the uctuations
in the futures risk premium must be common to uctuations in the expected return to
holding the spot. This makes the basis a poor predictor of expected returns, as empirically
documented in Fama and French (1986). The model provides an explanation for this fact.
A high expected future spot price relative to the current spot price encourages the producer
to hold more inventory. With increased inventory holding comes increased hedging demand.
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The resulting increased demand for short futures contracts increases the futures risk premium
needed to induce speculators to take the opposite side of these contracts. Thus, the futures
risk premium and expected change in the spot price tend to move together. The basis can
be written
S0   F = (S0   E [S1])  (F   E [S1]) ; (15)
which highlights the fact that the basis will not capture such a common component and
therefore is not a good signal of the futures risk premium.
In the following we empirically test the predictions of the model.
3 Data and Summary Statistics
We use time-series data on inventory holdings of commodities, commodity futures prices,
commodity spot prices, and hedger demand for futures contracts. In addition, we use mea-
sures of default risk obtained from balance sheet data from Compustat. We focus our analysis
on the energy sector in particular, we look at Heating Oil, Crude Oil, Gasoline and Natural
Gas.
3.1 Proxies for Fundamental Hedging Demand
In Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), agency costs are motivated as monitoring costs that
outside investors must incur to curb the agency problems a¤ecting rmsmanagers and
owners. In a large body of nance literature, such costs are larger in an expected sense
when rms are closer to defaulting on debt of the rm since the debtholder-equityholder
conicts become more severe in such states. The agency problems that kick in could either
be the underinvestment problem, as in Myers (1977), or asset-substitution problem, as in
Jensen and Meckling (1976). Indeed, costly state verication has been one of the economic
rationales for debt being the optimal nancing contract (Townsend (1979) and Gale and
Hellwig (1985)), and the equilibrium of these models features costly verication of states
only in the default states. Of course, in practice, we do see equity issuances by rms as well.
These are also however associated with signicant dilution costs, as theoretically motivated
by the adverse selection argument of Myers and Majluf (1984).
Empirical evidence on costs of external nance is plenty. Direct costs of bond and equity
issuance have been carefully examined by Altinkilic and Hansen (2000). They document
that these costs are substantial and that over 85% of the total underwriter spread is a vari-
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able cost and that the marginal cost of external nance is rising. Importantly, lower quality
o¤erings are at higher underwriter spreads. Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) and Bayless
and Chaplinsky (1996) document that equity issuance patterns of rms are procyclical con-
sistent with there being greater dilution costs from issuance during economic downturns and
recessions, a nding that is consistent with an increase in agency problems and default risk in
such times. There is also evidence that many distressed rms nd it di¢ cult to raise external
nance, unless their leverage is restructured in some fashion (Franks and Sanzhar (2006),
among others). Finally, it is well-known (though not as well academically documented) that
rms nd it extremely di¢ cult to borrow short-term (generally, in the commercial paper
market) unless they are investment-grade rated. That is, a deterioration in credit risk forces
rms to borrow long-term and su¤er a higher cost of capital.
An alternative driver of hedging demand is managerial aversion to distress and default.9
Empirical evidence has demonstrated that managerial turnover is indeed higher in rms with
higher leverage and deteriorating performance. For example, Coughlan and Schmidt (1985),
Warner et al. (1988), Weisbach (1988) provide evidence that top management turnover is
predicted by declining stock market performance. In an important study, Gilson (1989)
renes this evidence to also examine the role of defaults and leverage. He nds that man-
agement turnover is more likely following poor stock-market performance, but importantly
within the sample of rms (each year) that are in the bottom ve percent of stock-market
performance over a preceding three-year period (his sample being rms from NYSE and
AMEX over the period 1979 to 1984), the rms that are in default on their debt experience
greater top management turnover. Furthermore, higher leverage also increases the incidence
of turnover. However, management turnover by itself would not lead to a hedging demand
from managers if the personal costs managers face from such turnover are small. Gilson doc-
uments that following their resignation from rms in default, managers are not subsequently
employed by another exchange-listed rm for at least three years, a result that is consistent
with managers experiencing large personal costs when their rms default.
Given this theoretical and empirical motivation, we employ both balance-sheet and
market-based measures of default risk as our empirical proxies for the cost of external -
nance. The balance-sheet based measure we employ is the Zmijewski (1984) score. This
measure is positively related to default risk and is a variant of the Z-score of Altman (1968).
9Stulz (1984) proposes general aversion of managers to variance of cash ows as a driver of hedging
demand, the rationale being that while shareholders can diversify across rms in capital markets, managers
are signicantly exposed to their rmscash-ow risk due to incentive compensation as well as investments
in rm-specic human capital.
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The methodology for calculating the Zmijewski-score was developed by identifying the rm-
level balance-sheet variables that help discriminate" whether a rm is likely to default or
not. The market-based measures we employ are rst, the rolling three-year average stock
return of commodity producers, and second, the naive expected default frequency (or naive
EDF) computed by Bharath and Shumway (2008). The use of the rolling three-year aver-
age stock return is motivated by the analysis of Gilson (1989), who relates low cumulative
unadjusted three-year stock returns to default and managerial turnover.
3.2 Default Risk Data
The longest sample period of our analysis runs from the rst quarter of 1980 until the fourth
quarter of 2006 (108 quarters). This sample period varies across commodities and measures
according to data availability. To create the Zmijewski score, we require balance sheet
information for commodity producers, and we obtain this information by rst matching
companies with commodities based on their four-digit SIC code (these SIC codes are taken
from Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst (2007)). For Crude Oil, Heating Oil and Gasoline,
this is all rms in SIC codes 2910 and 2911, i.e., Petroleum Rening. There are 50 such rms
note that the default risk series is identical (across all measures) for Crude Oil, Heating
Oil and Natural Gas. For Natural Gas, this is all rms in SIC codes 1310 and 1311, i.e.,
Crude Petroleum and Gas Extraction. There are 475 such rms.
We then searched the merged CRSP-Compustat quarterly database for all companies
that are classied as belonging to these four-digit SIC codes, and for each company, we
compute:
Zmijewski-score =  4:3  4:5 NetIncome=TotalAssets+ 5:7  TotalDebt=TotalAssets
 0:004  CurrentAssets=CurrentLiabilities: (16)
For each period in which there are at least four rms in the data present, we take the
average Zmijewski score, and use it as our measure. In the following, we will denote the
Zmijewski score as AV GZm.
The rst market based measure we employ is the rolling three-year average stock return,
which is computed using monthly data from CRSP for each company. Writing Rit for the
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cum-dividend stock return for a rm i calculated at the end of month t, we compute:
ThreeY earAvgi;t =
1
36
35X
k=0
ln(1 +Ri;t k) (17)
We then select from this series ThreeY earAvgi;q at the end of each quarter q to match it
with our quarterly data frequency, and then average the measure across all rms i in each
commodity group to obtain the group-level average.
The second market based measure we employ is the naive EDF. The EDF from the
KMV-Merton model is computed using the formula:
EDF = 

 

ln(V=F ) + (  0:52V )T
v
p
T

(18)
where V is the total market value of the rm, F is the face value of the rms debt, v
is the volatility of the rms value,  is an estimate of the expected annual return of the
rms assets, and T is the time period, in this case, one year. Bharath and Shumway
(2008) compute a naiveestimate of the EDF, employing certain assumptions about the
variable used as inputs into the formula above. We use their estimates in our empirical
analysis.10 Of the set of 50 rms for Crude Oil, Heating Oil and Gasoline, we have naive
EDF estimates for 40 rms, and of the 475 rms in the Natural Gas group, we have naive
EDF estimates for 395. We average these measures across all rms in each time period to
get the commodity-group-level estimate.
[TABLE I ABOUT HERE]
Table I shows summary statistics for each of the aggregate default risk measures. The
measures of default risk are persistent, with quarterly autocorrelations ranging between 0:70
to 0:97. Figure 1 shows the time-series of the normalized AV G3Y , AV GZm and Naive EDF
series for Crude Oil, Heating Oil, and Gasoline, which all have the same default measures,
as the producer rms for these commodities all belong to the same SIC classication codes.
Figure 2 shows the same for Natural Gas. First, the series are correlated, but not identical.
As expected, the AV GZm-score and Naive EDF series move in the same direction, while
10We thank Sreedhar Bharath and Tyler Shumway for providing us with these estimates.
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AV G3Y moves in the opposite direction.11 Second, there is considerable time-variation in
measured default risk, which indicates there is economically signicant time-variation in the
fundamental hedging demand of producers in these commodity sectors.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
3.3 Basis and Excess Returns Data
To create the basis and excess returns measures, we follow the methodology of Gorton,
Hayashi and Rouwenhorst (2007), and employ data from Datastream. We constructed rolling
commodity futures excess returns at the end of each month as the one-period price di¤erence
in the nearest to maturity contract that would not expire during the next month. That is,
the excess return from the end of month t to the next is calculated as:
Ft+1;T   Ft;T
Ft;T
; (19)
where Ft;T is the futures price at the end of month t on the nearest contract whose expiration
date T is after the end of month t + 1, and Ft+1;T is the price of the same contract at the
end of month t+1. The quarterly return is constructed as the product of the three monthly
returns in the quarter.
We also employ measures of the spot returns on each commodity, which we take from the
Reuters-CRB dataset, employed by Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst (2007). The spot
returnis actually the return on the nearest-to-expiration futures contract, rolled into the
next futures contract upon expiration.
The futures basis is calculated for each commodity as (F1=F2   1), where F1 is the
nearest futures contract and F2 is the next nearest futures contract. We account for the
seasonality in the basis by including four quarterly dummy variables in all specications
employed to explain the basis. The statistical properties of our data match up very closely
to those employed by Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst (2007), summary statistics about
these quarterly measures are presented in Table I. Note that the means and medians of the
11Note that AV G3Y predicts default with a negative sign, while AV GZm and the naive EDF predict
default with a positive sign.
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basis in the table are computed using the raw data, while the standard deviation and rst-
order autocorrelation coe¢ cient are computed using the deseasonalized basis. The basis
does display some persistence once seasonality has been accounted for. Furthermore, the
average basis is positive for Crude Oil, Heating Oil and Gasoline, while Natural Gas has a
negative basis on average over the sample period. This indicates that the convenience yield
is on average positive for the three rst commodities. Note the relatively high standard
deviation of the basis, which indicates that the basis for each of the commodities at times
changes sign. Thus, time-varying convenience yields are an important feature of the data.
The excess returns are on average positive for all three commodities, ranging from 2:5%
to 6:7%, with relatively large standard deviations (overall in excess of 20%). As expected,
the sample autocorrelations of excess returns on the futures are close to zero.
3.4 Hedger Positions Data
The Hedger Net Positions data are obtained from Pinnacle Inc., which sources data directly
from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Classication into Hedgers,
Speculators and Small traders is done by the CFTC, and the reported data are the total
open positions, both short and long, of each of these trader types across all maturities of
futures contracts. We measure the net position of all hedgers in each period as:
HedgersNetPositiont =
(HedgersShortPositiont  HedgersLongPositiont)
(HedgersShortPositiont 1 +HedgersLongPositiont 1)
(20)
This normalization means that the net positions are measured relative to the aggregate open
interest of hedgers in the previous quarter. Summary statistics on these data are shown in
Table I. First, the hedger positions are on average positive, which means investors classied as
hedgers are on average short the commodity forwards. However, the standard deviations are
relatively large, indicating that there are times when hedgers actually are net long whereas
speculators are net short. This is a feature of the data we do not capture in our model.
The autocorrelation of the hedger positions is mostly positive, but not as persistent as the
autocorrelation of the measures of default risk. Thus, the hedging demand, as measured by
the number of forward contracts hedgers hold, does not appear one for one with the aggregate
default risk in the commodity sector. There are several reasons for this. Empirically, the
variable that classies investors as hedgers or speculators is quite noisy. For instance, the
relative positions are given per commodity, not per contract. Thus, common strategies, for
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instance the "calendar spread" where one goes long (short) the long term forward and short
(long) the short term forward on the same commodity, cannot be identied. In addition,
the classication of who is a hedger and who is a speculator can sometimes be di¢ cult. As
an example, many production rms run trading desks as a part of their business. The line
between a hedge trade or a speculator trade is therefore blurred. It is important to note these
empirical di¤erences as they help explain why hedger demand does not signicantly forecast
forward risk premiums (see Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst, 2007), while measures of
default risk do.
3.5 Inventory Data
Aggregate inventories are created as per the specications in Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwen-
horst (2007). For all four energy commodities, these are obtained from the Department of
Energys Monthly Energy Review. For Crude Oil, we use the item: U.S. crude oil ending
stocks non-SPR, thousands of barrels.For Heating Oil, we use the item: U.S. total distil-
late stocks. For Gasoline, we use: U.S. total motor gasoline ending stocks, thousands of
barrels.Finally, for Natural Gas, we use: U.S. total natural gas in underground storage
(working gas), millions of cubic feet.Following Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst (2007),
we compute a measure of the discretionary level of aggregate inventory by subtracting tted
trend inventory from the quarterly realized inventory. Quarterly trend inventory is created
using a Hodrick-Prescott lter with the recommended smoothing parameter. In all speci-
cations employing inventories, we employ quarterly dummy variables. We do so in order to
control for the strong seasonality present in inventories. The nal panel in Table II shows
summary statistics of the resulting aggregate inventory measure, i.e., the cyclical component
of inventory stocks, for the commodities. Once the seasonality in inventories is accounted
for, the autocorrelation is high and positive.
4 Empirical Results
This section presents our empirical results. The novel predictions of our model are the
following. Aggregate commodity sector fundamental hedging demand should be positively
related to the respective commoditys futures risk premium. We have argued that funda-
mental drivers of hedging demand is linked to measures of default risk. In particular, high
default risk on average leads to higher hedging demand. Further, there should be a common
20
component in the expected change in the spot price and the futures risk premium except
in times of low inventory (inventory stock-out in the model). This common component is
why the basis, as shown in previous research (e.g., Fama and French (1986)), is not a strong
forecaster of the time-series of commodity futures risk premiums, but instead is more tightly
linked to uctuations in inventory. Finally, we investigate whether two outcomes are as pre-
dicted by the model: hedger short futures positions should be higher and inventories lower
when the producersaverage default risk is high.
4.1 The Futures Risk Premium and Default Risk
To evaluate whether the measures of commodity sector default risk are important for ex-
plaining futures risk premiums, we run standard forecasting regressions. In particular, we
regress quarterly (excess) futures returns on one quarter lagged measures of default risk
(DefRisk):
ExcessReturnsi;t+1 = QtrDummiest+1 + iDefRiski;t + ui;t+1; (21)
where i denotes the commodity and t denotes time measured in quarters. All regressions
include quarterly dummy variables to control for the strong seasonal variation in inventory,
basis and returns.
We then re-run the same regression, but add in controls:
ExcessReturnsi;t+1 = QtrDummiest+1 + iDefRiski;t +ControlV ariablest + ui;t+1; (22)
In a standard asset pricing setting, time-varying aggregate risk aversion and/or aggregate
risk can give rise to time-variation in excess returns. We therefore include business cycle
variables that have been shown to forecast excess asset returns in previous research. We
include the Default Spread, the yield spread between Baa and Aaa rated corporate bond
yields, which proxies for aggregate default risk in the economy and has been shown to
forecast excess returns to stocks and bonds (see, e.g., Fama and French (1989)). We also
include the Payout Ratio, which is dened as ln(1+ Net payout / Market Value). Here
Net Payout is the aggregate equity market cash dividends plus repurchases minus equity
issuance, while Market Value is the aggregate market value of outstanding equity. In a
recent paper, Boudoukh, Michaely, Richardson, and Roberts (2007), show that this measure
of the aggregate dividend yield dominates the cash dividend only aggregate dividend yield
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commonly used in terms of forecasting aggregate equity market returns. Finally, we include
cay, Lettau and Ludvigsons (2001) proxy for the aggregate consumption-wealth ratio.
In addition to these controls, we include the lagged level of aggregate inventory and the
lagged basis to control for other possible determinants of the futures risk premium. Table II
shows the results of the univariate regression as well as the regression with controls, across
the four commodities considered.
[TABLE II ABOUT HERE]
First, we note that in all cases, the regression coe¢ cients have the predicted sign; an
increase in default risk forecasts higher futures returns over the next quarter. For AV GZm,
the regression coe¢ cients are signicant at the 10% level or more, using Newey-West t-
statistics with 3 lags, in 5 out of 8 regressions. The strongest evidence is for Crude Oil and
Heating Oil, which are the two commodities which have the longest return series available
(91 and 108 quarters, respectively). This result is reinforced with the use of the market-
based AV G3Y and Naive EDF measures, for which the patterns detected with the balance
sheet measure are even more clear. The joint tests, which pool all commodities together
(after normalizing individual LHS and RHS variables by their commodity-specic standard
deviations), are also all consistent with the commodity-specic results. Thus, our measures
of fundamental producer hedging demand are indeed positively related to the futures risk
premium in univariate regressions, as predicted by our model.
The results with respect to the proxies for default risk are virtually unchanged once
the regressions incorporate controls. The individual coe¢ cients are signicant in 9 of the
12 regressions and all of the right sign, with the exception of the EDF and Natural Gas,
which has a negative but insignicant coe¢ cient. The signicance level of the joint tests has
increased and are they now all signicant at the 5% level or better. From this we conclude
that default risk is an important determinant of commodity futures risk premiums above and
beyond previously documented business cycle variation in some combination of aggregate risk
and risk tolerance. This results lends support to the models implicit assumption of some
degree of market segmentation between the stock market and the energy commodity markets
considered here.
The R2s range between 6:3% and 11:5% in the univariate regressions with signicant
coe¢ cients, with an overall average around 9%. A one standard deviation increase in de-
fault risk is on average associated with approximately a 3% increase in expected futures
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returns, using the joint test estimates. Thus, we uncover both economically and statistically
signicant variation in the commodity futures risk premiums using our measures of default
risk.
In sum, the evidence in Table II supports the hypothesis that a fundamental driver
of hedging demand, default risk, is an important determinant for commodity futures risk
premiums. The relation between producershedging demand and the futures risk premium
is positive, consistent with the model.
4.2 Default Risk and Spot Commodity Returns
Next, we consider the relation between spot commodity returns and the measures of default
risk. The model predicts a common component in the expected return to holding the spot
and the futures risk premium that is driven by fundamental hedging demand. Table III
reports the results of the following regression:
SpotReturnsi;t+1 = QtrDummiest+1 + iDefRiski;t + ui;t+1; (23)
where i denotes the commodity and t denotes time measured in quarters.
We then re-run the same regression, but add in the same set of controls as for the futures
excess return regressions:
SpotReturnsi;t+1 = QtrDummiest+1 + iDefRiski;t + ControlV ariablest + ui;t+1; (24)
[TABLE III ABOUT HERE]
Table III shows that there is a clear relation between default risk and spot returns on
commodities. This is especially true when the regressions incorporate the control variables.
The controls related to the lagged inventory level and basis are particularly important for
the spot price. Seasonality and lower frequency uctuations in inventory leads to spot price
predictability through the Theory of Storage aspect of these markets, also in the case where
producers do not have a hedging demand.
In the regressions, high producer hedging demand leads to high expected returns to
holding the spot (ignoring storage costs) - all the statistically signicant regression coe¢ cients
(9 out 12) have the predicted sign. Further, the joint tests all have the right sign and are
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signicant at the 5% level or better. Notably, the magnitude of the coe¢ cients are similar
to the ones obtained in the regressions forecasting the futures returns. This implies that
the common component in the expected futures returns and spot price appreciation are of a
similar size. This is as predicted by the model and key to explaining why these uctuations
in the futures risk premium are not uncovered by the basis. The futures thus inherits the
risk of the spot as the producer trades o¤holding spot and hedging with future contracts. In
equilibrium, the cost of hedging with the futures must equal the marginal benet of holding
an additional unit of the spot.
This result also highlights the empirical relevance of another important feature of the
model. In the model, a decrease in the futures risk premium leads to an increase in the spot
price as producers are willing to hold more inventory when the cost of hedging is lower. The
spot regressions are consistent with this result, as an increase in the spot price all else equal
leads to a lower spot premium. To the extent the massive increase in speculator demand for
long commodity futures positions over the recent years led to a decrease in the futures risk
premium, we should expect to have seen an increase in the spot price. This e¤ect is due to
the increased risk-sharing between producers and speculators enabled on account of a lower
futures risk premium. Note that an increase in spot prices can occur through this channel
even if there are no changes in current and expected future demand for the commodity.
Robustness: Persistence of Default Risk Measures The observed persistence of the
default risk measures suggests that there may be problems in incorporating these mea-
sures into forecasting regressions for commodity futures returns (see Stambaugh (1999) and
Lewellen (2004) for the biases inherent in predicting returns with persistent nancial ratios).
To check the robustness of our test results to such problems, we detrended the time series of
the most persistent forecasting variables (AV GZm and AV G3Y ).12 We nd that all of our
results are qualitatively unchanged when this is done.
4.3 Hedger Positions and Default Risk
The above results lead to the natural question: Are hedging positions then correlated with
default risk in the manner predicted by the theory? We now address this question using
the available data on net hedger positions from the CFTC. As explained in Section 3, the
12To do so, we used the Hodrick-Prescott lter, and the recommended quarterly smoothing parameter of
1600, and made sure to detrend each series using information only up to and including period t. This was
to ensure that the forecasting regressions are not contaminated by the use of future information.
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aggregate data on hedger positions is noisy and other studies (e.g., Gorton, Hayashi and
Rouwenhorst, 2007) have shown that these measures of hedger positions do not signicantly
forecast excess futures returns as predicted by the hedging demand channel, although the
sign is right. This result can be ascribed to an errors-in-variables problem. However, a noisy
measure of hedger positions should still contain information about the true hedger positions.
Therefore, we regress the hedger positions on the measures of default risk to uncover this
component. Since hedger positions is the dependent variable in these regressions, the errors-
in-variables problem described is alleviated.
The variables are constructed as the net short position, so we should expect high de-
fault risk to predict next periods hedger positions with a positive sign in the regressions.
Furthermore, rather than a contemporaneous regression, we run a forecasting regression for
hedger positions, in the event there is some delay before hedgers put their positions in place
and to establish causality:
HedgerNetPositioni;t+1 = QtrDummiest+1 + iDefRiski;t + ui;t+1: (25)
We then re-run the same regression, but add in the same set of controls as we did for the
futures excess return regressions:
HedgerNetPositioni;t+1 = QtrDummiest+1 + iDefRiski;t + ControlV ariablest + ui;t+1;
(26)
[TABLE IV ABOUT HERE]
Table IV shows that the signs are as predicted in all but two of the univariate regressions,
and that 10 of 15 of the coe¢ cients are statistically signicant. When controls are added,
this increases to 11 of 15 regressions. The results in this table conrm that hedgers short
positions are indeed determined by the level of default risk of producing rms. Together
with the evidence presented earlier connecting the futures risk premium to default risk,
this evidence further strengthen the conclusion that the fundamental, primitive measures of
hedging demand used in this paper capture a component of realized hedging demand that is
important for futures risk premiums. The R2s in these regressions are on average about 20%.
While some of unexplained variation in the hedger position variable can be attributed to the
variable being a noisy measure of the truth, it also likely indicates, perhaps unsurprisingly,
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that a substantial amount of the trading in the futures market is not accounted for by our
simple model.
4.4 Inventory and Default Risk
Finally, we check whether the specic mechanism predicted by the theory operates correctly,
i.e., whether changes in default risk translate into changes in discretionary holdings of inven-
tory. Again, rather than a contemporaneous regression, we run a forecasting regression for
changes in aggregate inventory, in the event there is some friction preventing hedgers from
immediately implementing their strategies and to establish causality:
ChangeInventoryi;t+1 = QtrDummiest+1 + iDefRiski;t + ui;t+1: (27)
We then re-run the same regression, but add in the same set of controls as we did for
the futures excess return regressions. We augment these controls in two ways: rst, with
measures of forecasted GDP and Industrial Production growth over the following quarter,
as measured by the average growth forecast in the Philadelphia Feds survey of professional
forecasters. This is to pick up any variation in inventory arising from intertemporal variations
in demand that would naturally lead to time-variation in the inventory holdings. Second, we
augment the set of controls with four lagged values of changes in inventory, in case there are
seasonalities in changes in inventory that are not captured by the quarterly dummy variables.
We run:
ChangeInventoryi;t+1 = QtrDummiest+1 + iDefRiski;t
+
4X
k=1
iChangeInventoryi;t k + ControlV ariablest + ui;t+1; (28)
[TABLE V ABOUT HERE]
Table V shows that while the univariate regressions do not generate clean support for our
theory, once controls are added, the regressions reveal that the signs are as predicted in all
but three of the regressions. Moreover, the joint test results all have the predicted sign and
they are statistically signicant for AV G3Y and Naive EDF. For AV GZm, the t-statistic
for the joint test results is 1.52. This evidence suggests that the mechanism we identify in
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the paper connecting discretionary changes in inventory with measures of default risk is a
reasonable one.
As in the model, the empirical results presented in this paper indicate that the primitive
driving force is the producers fundamental hedging demand: An increase in default risk
leads to a subsequent decrease in the optimal inventory holding, which in turn lowers the
current spot price and increases future expected spot prices. The increase in default risk also
increases the producersdemand for hedging in the futures market, which in turn increases
the futures risk premium.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have demonstrated theoretically as well as empirically that the default
risk of commodity producers is a signicant determinant of their hedging demand in futures
markets, and, in turn, of futures prices and risk premia. It is through the channel of the
hedging demand of producers that commodity futures markets activity, measured for example
as the increase in speculative activity, can a¤ect spot prices by allowing production schedules
(Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995)) and inventory holdings (our paper) to adjust better
to current and future demand shocks.
The model allows us to shed light on an important recent debate whether speculative
activity in the oil futures market has been responsible for the gyrations in oil spot prices. We
show that this is theoretically possible, when producers have hedging demands, as changes in
speculative positions change the costs of hedging for producers, in turn changing inventory
holdings and thus spot prices. Empirically we verify that the default risk of oil and gas
producers (a proxy for their risk aversion) is a signicant determinant of producershedging
demand in oil and gas futures markets, and in turn, of spot and futures prices and futures
risk premia.
Much work remains to be done in order to understand these relationships fully, especially
from an empirical standpoint. First, it would be interesting to isolate the innovations in the
default risk of producers and relate these to futures prices in a VAR framework. Second,
though default risk proxies are hard to come by for other commodities due to relatively
few producers, it would be interesting to see if our results are veried for a broader set of
commodities than oil and gas. Third, in recent times, demand shocks to commodity markets
have largely arisen from increased demand for commodities from fast developing countries
like India and China. An interesting avenue for further research would be to investigate
27
the role of such global demand shifts on commodity inventories and spot and futures prices.
Exploring the role of such demand shocks in a model such as ours would open the possibility
of understanding their contribution to the recent volatility in commodity prices, relative to
the contribution of increased speculative activity in futures markets activity which could
indeed have been price-stabilizing.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proofs of results given in the main body of paper
Proof of Proposition 1.
Here we consider the e¤ect of speculator risk aversion. We focus on as = 1= (~as2S) as it
simplies the exposition.13 First, note that the market clearing level of aggregate inventory
is increasing in speculator risk tolerance unless there is an inventory stock-out, for which
case it remains at zero.
Proof. First, consider the case of no stock-out,  = 0. In this case,
(as + ap) (E [S1 (I)]  S0 (I)) = I + g1: (29)
The implicit function theorem yields
E [S1 (I)]  S0 (I) + (as + ap) dI
das

E

dS1
dI

  dS0
dI

=
dI
das
: (30)
m
(E [S1 (I)]  S0 (I))

1  (as + ap)

E

dS1
dI

  dS0
dI
 1
=
dI
das
(31)
(Remember, S0 = a0 + f (g0   I) and S1 = a1 + f (g1 + I). Thus, since f 0 < 0, dS0dI > 0, and
dS1
dI
< 0.) Since (E [S1 (I)]  S0 (I)) > 0 and E

dS1
dI
   dS0
dI
< 0, it follows that dI
das
> 0. In
the case of an inventory stock-out, we have trivially that dI
das
= 0.
This implies trivially that the spot price is increasing in speculator risk tolerance, since
S0 = a0 + f (g0   I), since f 0 < 0.
Finally, the futures risk premium is decreasing in speculator risk tolerance.
Proof. First, consider the partial impact on the futures risk premium of a change in inven-
tory in the case of no stock-out, so S0 = F:
@
@I

E [S1]  S0
S0

=
@(E[S1] S0)
@I
S0   (E [S1]  S0) @S0@I
S20
< 0: (32)
Since, E

@S1
@I
  @S0
@I
< 0, E [S1 (I)]  S0 (I) > 0, and @S0@I > 0, we have that the sign on the
change in the risk premium relative to the aggregate inventory level is negative.
13This transformation of variables does not a¤ect the sign of the derivatives other than in the obvious way
(tolerance versus aversion means it is ipped) as the price volatility is constant in this model.
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Next, consider the case of a stock-out. Now, price in period 0 and expected price in
period 1 stay constant. The futures risk premium is given by
E [S1]  F
F
=
E [S1]  S0 + 
S0    : (33)
(as + ap) (E [S1 (I
)]  S0 (I) + ) = I + g1:
First consider the derivative of  with respect to as:
(E [S1 (I)]  S0 (I) + ) + (as + ap)

@E [S1 (I)]
@I
dI
das
  @S0 (I)
@I
dI
das
+
d
das

=
dI
das
: (34)
Since in a stock-out dI
das
= 0, we have that
d
das
=   (E [S1]  F ) = (as + ap) : (35)
Since we only achieve market clearing in the futures market if E [S1] F > 0, it must be that
d
das
< 0. Given this, the derivative of the futures risk premium in the case of a stock-out is
d
das
(S0   ) + (E [S1]  S0 + ) ddas
(S0   )2
< 0, (36)
since E [S1]  S0 +  > 0; S0    > 0, and  > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
First, we consider the e¤ect on inventory of an increase in producer risk tolerance, ap.
Proof. First, consider the case of no stock-out,  = 0. In this case,
(as + ap) (E [S1 (I)]  S0 (I)) = I + g1: (37)
Then
(E [S1 (I)]  S0 (I)) + (as + ap) dI
daH

E

dS1
dI

  dS0
dI

=
dI
dap
: (38)
m
(E [S1 (I)]  S0 (I))

1  (as + ap)

E

dS1
dI

  dS0
dI
 1
=
dI
dap
(39)
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(Remember, S0 = a0 + f (g0   I) and S1 = a1 + f (g1 + I). Thus, since f 0 < 0, dS0dI > 0, and
dS1
dI
< 0.) Since (E [S1 (I)]  S0 (I)) > 0 and E

dS1
dI
   dS0
dI
< 0, it follows that dI
dap
> 0. In
the case of an inventory stock-out, we have trivially that dI
dap
= 0.
Given this and results already shown above it also follows that the futures risk premium
is decreasing in hedger risk tolerance. Finally, a decrease in inventory leads to a decrease in
the spot price from the inverse demand function.
Proof of Proposition 3
The basis result is derived in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 4
Here we derive the e¤ects of an increase in future expected consumer demand, a  E [a1].
First, we show that an increase in expected future consumer demand leads to an increase in
the optimal equilibrium inventory holding.
Proof. The intuition is simple - if prices are expected to be higher tomorrow, it pays o¤ to
hold inventory and wait to sell until then. This must happen until equilibrium is restored or
there is a stock-out. First, consider the case of no stock-out,  = 0. In this case,
(as + ap)

E

@S1 (a1; I)
@I
dI
da1
+
@S1 (a1; I)
@a1

  @S0 (I)
@I
dI
da1

=
dI
da1
(40)
m
(as + ap)E

@S1 (a1; I)
@a1

1  (as + ap)

E

@S1 (a1; I)
@I

  @S0 (I)
@I
 1
=
dI
da1
:(41)
Since E
h
@S1(a1;I)
@a1
i
> 0 and E

@S1
@I
   @S0
@I
< 0, it follows that dI
da1
> 0. In the case of an
inventory stock-out, we have trivially that dI
da1
= 0.
An increase in inventory leads to a higher current spot price. Since the spot demand has
increased, spot prices are also higher in expectation in the future.
Next, we show that we cannot in general determine the e¤ect on the futures risk premium
on an increase in expected future consumer demand.
Proof. In the case of no stock out ( = 0), the futures risk premium (frp) wrt a is
dfrp
da
=
@frp
@a
+
@frp
@I
dI
da
: (42)
Since, @frp
@a
= 1
P0
> 0, @frp
@I
< 0, dI
da
> 0, the sign depends on the relative magnitudes of these
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terms. Substituting into the above, we have
dfrp
da
S0 = 1 +

@E[S1]
@I
S0   E [S1] @S0@I

(as + ap)E
h
@S1(a1;I)
@a1
i
S0   S0 (as + ap)

E
h
@S1(a1;I)
@I
i
  @S0(I)
@I
 (43)
= 1 +

@E[S1]
@I
S0   E [S1] @S0@I

(as + ap)E
h
@S1
@a1
i
S0   S0 (as + ap)
 
E

@S1
@I
  @S0
@I
 (44)
Note that @S1
@a1
= 1, and so
dfrp
da
S0 = 1 +
@E[S1]
@I
  E[S1]
S0
@S0
@I
1
as+ap
   E @S1
@I
  @S0
@I
 (45)
Thus, the sign of the derivative is positive if
@E[S1]
@I
  E[S1]
S0
@S0
@I
1
as+ap
   E @S1
@I
  @S0
@I
 >  1 (46)
m
@E [S1]
@I
  E [S1]
S0
@S0
@I
>   1
as + ap
+ E

@S1
@I

  @S0
@I
(47)
m
E [S1]
S0
  1

@S0
@I
<
1
as + ap
: (48)
In the case of no stock out, we cannot in general sign this derivative in the case. Next, we
consider the case of a stock-out.
Next, we consider the case of a stock-out (I = 0,  > 0):
Proof. In the case of a stock-out ( > 0), the futures risk premium (frp) wrt a is
dfrp
da
=
@frp
@a
+
@frp
@
d
da
: (49)
We have that
frp =
E [S1]  S0 + 
S0    : (50)
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Then
@frp
@a
=
1
S0
> 0; (51)
@frp
@
=
E [S1]
(S0   )2
> 0; (52)
d
da
=  1 < 0: (53)
The last derivative can be found by applying the Implicit Function Theorem on the equilib-
rium equation used earlier. Thus,
(as + ap)

E

@S1
@I
dI
da
+
@S1
@a

  @S0
@I
dI
da
+
d
da

=
dI
da
: (54)
Since in a stock-out, dI
da
= 0, we have that d
da
=  1 < 0. Thus,
dfrp
da
=
@frp
@a
  @frp
@
(55)
=
1
S0
  E [S1]
(S0   )2
(56)
=
(S0   )2
S0 (S0   )2
  S0 (S0   + k)
S0 (S0   )2
(57)
sign :
= 2   S0  S0k <  S0k < 0; (58)
where we use the equilibrium expression for E [S1] : E [S1]   (S0   ) = I+g1as+ap = k > 0.
Thus, the futures risk premium is decreasing in the expected future consumer demand in
the case of an inventory stock-out.
Conjecture 3 Aggregate hedger demand for short futures contracts is increasing in aggregate
inventory.
Proof. The conjecture implicitly assumes no stock-out, so here  = 0. Aggregate hedger
demand is given by
hp = I
 + g1 +
F   E [S1]
ap2S
: (59)
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Thus,
dhp
dI
= 1 +
d
dI

S0   E [S1]
ap2S

(60)
= 1 +
d(S0 E[S1])
dI
ap
2
S   (S0   E [S1])
d(ap2S)
dI
a2p
4
S
: (61)
Since dS0
dI
  E dS1
dI

> 0, and S0   E [S1] < 0, and d(ap
2
S)
dI
= 0, the sign of the change in
aggregate hedging demand is increasing in inventory.
7 Model with Costly External Finance
The main focus of the model is on commodity producers as these agents have the inventory
storage technology in place to take advantage of di¤erences in the spot and the futures
prices: They can either sell a unit of the commodity now and put the proceeds of the sale
in a risk-free savings instrument or enter a short futures contract and store the commodity
for delivery. Both strategies result in known cash-ows in the future and therefore yield a
no-arbitrage restriction.14 The U.S. Energy Information Administration notes the existence
of these players in both the oil and gas markets and their importance for futures price
e¢ ciency (see REF). The partial equilibrium framework we employ exploits the no-arbitrage
restrictions these agents impose on the market to derive implications for futures prices.
Producers are assumed to have a hedging demand which we model as arising from costs
of external nancing as in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993). Otherwise, the model is
a two-period version of the Deaton and Laroque (1992) model of commodity prices and
optimal inventory management. While we use costly external nance needed to meet rms
growth options as the rationale for a hedging demand, the model is also consistent with the
other channels for hedging as emphasized by Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993). Indeed,
our empirical proxies will partly rely on these alternative interpretations, the two relevant
interpretations being hedging driven by managerial risk-aversion (Stulz, 1984, due to lack of
diversication for managers, and Breeden and Viswanathan, 1990, and DeMarzo and Du¢ e
(1995), for better performance assessment), managerial aversion to distress (Gilson (1989)),
and costs of nancial distress to the rm (Smith and Stulz (1985)).15
14This argument assumes that there is no credit risk in the futures market, which is a reasonable assumption
for exchange traded futures.
15In the Appendix, we present a model where managers of commodity producing rms are risk averse and
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7.1 Consumption, Production and the Spot Price
Each period ct units of the good is consumed. The production schedule is predetermined and
production each period is denoted gt. Thus, we have in mind an economy where the time and
cost required to adjust production schedules to transitory demand shocks are prohibitively
large.16 The current economy-wide inventory level of the commodity is denoted It and
goods in inventory depreciate at a rate d. Storage costs are assumed to be included in the
depreciation rate. Market clearing demands that incoming inventory and current production,
gt + (1  d) It 1, equals current consumption and outgoing inventory, ct + It. This equality
can be rearranged and we get:
ct = gt  It (62)
where It  It   (1  d) It 1. Let the spot price of the commodity be denoted St. We
assume the immediate use demand, ct (at; St), is monotone decreasing in the spot price St
given a level of the current demand shock, at. We summarize the spot market as follows:
St = f (at; gt  It) ; (63)
where f is decreasing in the supply, gt It, and the demand shock, at.17 The demand shock
represents exogenous shifts in the commodity demand. The same inverse demand function
is assumed in Routledge, Seppi, and Spatt (2000). It is useful to dene the variable   1 d
1+r
,
where r is the simple net risk-free rate. This variable measures the nancial loss incurred
of holding a unit of the commodity in inventory due to depreciation and the time-value of
money. For ease of exposition and without loss of generality, we assume that r = 0.
7.2 Producers
Producers are risk-neutral price takers who maximize expected prots through optimal inven-
tory management, hedging in futures, and investment. In period 0, the rm stores an amount
show that the implications arising from this alternative channel of hedging demand yields the same predictions
for the relation between producer hedging demand and the futures risk premium. This alternative model is
more closely related to the speculation and hedging demand models of Anderson and Danthine (1981, 1983)..
16We will in the empirical section consider the behavior of short-term commodity futures contracts. Ar-
guably, short-term contracts are more inuenced by inventory uctuations than shocks to longer term supply
and demand.
17We assume throughout the analysis that at and f are specied such that (a) prices are positive and (b)
a market-clearing spot price exists. For instance, a convenient assumption is that limy!0 f (x; y) = 1 for
all x, which ensures an interior maximum solution to the optimal inventory problem (there could still be
inventory stock-outs).
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I as inventory from its current supply, g0, and so period 0 prots are simply S0 (g0   I). The
rm also enters h short futures contracts for delivery in period 1. In period 1, the rm sells
its current inventory and production supply, honors its futures contracts and realizes a prot
of S1 ((1  d) I + g1) + h (F   S1), where F is the forward price of the futures contracts.
At the end of period 1, producers can in addition exercise growth options of the rm.
In particular, the net present value at time 1 of the output of an investment of size X is
g (X)   X, where g (X) is a concave increasing function (g0 > 0; g00 < 0). Thus, the net
present value of investment exhibits decreasing marginal returns to scale.18 One can think
of g (X) as the ex-dividend value of the rm at time 1. After the demand shock is observed
at time 1, the producers solve
max g (X) X   C (e) (64)
subject to
X  w + e; (65)
where
w = S0 (g0   I) + S1 ((1  d) I + g1) + h (F   S1) (66)
is the internal funds of the producer. Notice that we allow the producer to invest the cash
proceeds from time 0 sales at the risk-free rate at the risk-free rate. The function C (e) is
a cost function that is increasing in the amount of external nancing e the rm requires:
e = X   w. If the rm faces costs of external nance,  > 0, and the severity of the costs is
increasing in . The maximization can then be written
max
X
g (X) X   C (X   w) ; (67)
and the rst order condition gives
g0 (X)  1 = C 0 (e) : (68)
For the constrained rm (i.e., equation (65) binds), the invested amount is increasing in the
amount of internal funds, 0 < dX
dw
< 1:19 Thus, future commodity production is increasing
in the amount of internal funds, and so the externality due to C () is detrimental to the
18This will be the case if, for instance, there are technological decreasing returns to scale.
19In particular, from the rst order condition, we have that dX

dw =
 C00
g00 C00 :
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economy assuming that higher production of the commodity is benecial. Since marginal
returns to investment are decreasing and since costs of external nancing are convex, the rm
has a demand for hedging period 1 prots (see Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993)). The
rm can, in principle, use both short futures positions and increased inventory to alleviate
the nancing constraint.
The rmsproblem is then
max
fI;hg
S0 (g0   I)+E [S1 ((1  d) I + g1) + h (F   S1)]+E [g (X) X   C (X   w)] (69)
subject to
I  0; (70)
where X denotes the optimal period 1 investment. Note that dX
dI
= dX
dw
dw
dI
= dX
dw
(1  d)S1 >
0 and that dX
dh
= dX
dw
dw
dh
= dX
dw
(F   S1) > 0 if F > S1 but dXdh < 0 if F < S1. Thus, short
futures contracts is a direct way to transfer money from high S1 states to low S1 states, while
inventory yields internal funds that are proportional to the period 1 spot price.
It will be useful to dene
~g (X; ) = g0 (X)  1 = C 0 (X   w) ; (71)
which is the marginal benet of an additional unit of internal funds, w.20 If the rm is
nancially constrained, this term is positive. If the rm is not nancially constrained, this
term is zero.
20I.e., ~g  ddw (g (X) X   C (X   w)) = (g0   1  C 0) dX

dw + C
0: From, the rst order condition,
we have that g0   1  C 0 = 0, so ~g = C 0.
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7.2.1 Optimal Inventory and Hedging Demand
The rst order condition with respect to inventory is:
S0 = E [S1] + E

(g0 (X)  1  C 0 (e)) dX

dI
+ C 0 (e)
de
dw
dw
dI

+  (72)
m
S0   E [S1] = E [(S1   S0) ~g (X; )] +  (73)
m
S0   E [S1] = Cov [S1; ~g (X; )]
1 + E [~g (X; )]
+

1 + E [~g (X; )]
; (74)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier on the slack inventory constraint.21 Note that when the
rm has not fully hedged its period 1 price exposure, the covariance between period 1 spot
price and the marginal benet of internal funds (Cov [S1; ~g (X; )]) is negative, and therefore
we have that S0 < E [S1] when  = 0. I.e., there is a positive expected return to holding
spot even in the case when there are no storage costs ( = 1) as holding inventory is risky
for the rm relative to selling it and holding cash. If the inventory constraint binds, the
convenience yield of holding the spot will increase since in this case  > 0. In this case, the
spot price can rise above the expected future spot prices.
7.2.2 The Futures Risk Premium and the Hedging Demand for Futures
The rm can also use short futures contracts to hedge against low period 1 internal funds.
The futures contract is a direct hedge of uctuations in period 1 spot price, as opposed to
inventory which generates additional funds in all states of the world and more so if the spot
price is high (when it is less needed). The rst order condition with respect to the number
21We go from the rst to the second equation by noting that dedw =  1 and dwdI = (1  d)S1   S0. Also,
the period 1 optimization of the rm implies that g0 (X)  1  C 0 (e) = 0.
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of short futures positions, h, is:
E

F   S1 + (g0 (X)  1  C 0 (e)) dX

dh
+ C 0 (e)
dw
dh

= 0 (75)
m
E [S1]  F = E [(F   S1) ~g (X; )] (76)
m
E [S1]  F =  Cov (S1; ~g (X; ))
1 + E [~g (X; )]
: (77)
The cost of hedging a period 1 spot sale with a short futures position is E [S1]   F . Thus,
if the futures price is below the expected period 1 spot price, hedging with the futures
contract is costly for the rm and the rm chooses not to hedge its period 1 supply fully
(i.e., Cov (S1; ~g) < 0). The equation above shows that in equilibrium the marginal cost
equals the marginal benet, where the benet of hedging with the futures contract is given
by E [(F   S1) ~g (X; )]: The payo¤ of the futures position (F   S1) times the marginal
benet of additional internal funds.
Note that if the futures risk premium is zero, the rm will hedge fully the price exposure
of its period 1 supply of the commodity. In this case, the return to holding the spot in
inventory is also zero. Further, if the producers do not have a hedging demand ( = 0), the
futures risk premium will be driven to zero by the producers. We will in the following be
interested in the cases where the futures risk premium is positive, which means that hedging
using futures is costly for the rm. In this case, changes in hedging demand or the cost of
hedging (the futures risk premium) will a¤ect the producers optimal inventory and futures
positions.
7.2.3 The Futures Basis
The futures basis is dened as the di¤erence between the spot price and the futures price, S0 
F . If the futures price is below the spot price, the market is said to be in "backwardation",
while if the futures price is above the spot price, the market is in "contango".22 The basis is
sometimes used as a proxy for the futures risk premium by appealing to the decomposition
S0 F = (E [S1]  F ) (E [S1]  S0), where the rst component is the futures risk premium.
22This is today the usual denition of contango and backwardation. We note that in the Theory of Normal
Backwardation, Keynes instead dened backwardation as when the futures price is below the expected future
spot price.
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However, empirically, the basis is not a good forecaster of time-variation in commodity
futures returns (see Fama and French (1986)). Our model shows how a common component
in the spot and futures risk premium, which explains this empirical fact, arises due to the
equilibrium behavior of competitive inventory managers.
Consistent with the empirical literature, we normalize the basis with the current level
of the spot price. Using the rst order conditions over inventory and futures hedging, we
obtain:
S0   F
S0
= 1  1

+
1

=S0
1 + E [~g (X; )]
; (78)
where the derivation is given in the Appendix.
From this expression we can see that the basis in general is a function of whether there
is an inventory stock-out ( > 0), the costs of storage ( < 1), and hedging demand ~g. How-
ever, unless there is an inventory stock-out, the basis is constant and less than zero. Thus,
the inventory stock-out channel, which is central to the Theory of Storage, is the main de-
terminant of the commodity basis in our model. This link between inventory levels and the
commodity basis has been empirically documented in many studies, most recently in Gorton,
Hayashi, and Rouwenhorst (2007). The value of  < 1 shows up in the basis as a higher
required futures price to compensate for the costs of storage.
The fact that the basis is constant in the case of no stock-out implies that variation
in the futures risk premium must be o¤set by variation in the spot risk premium. This
common component arises from the producers arbitrage technology (i.e, their ability to store
the commodity, hold cash and invest in futures). Since holding cash earns a zero return, the
benet of selling inventory at a higher future price must exactly cancel out with the cost of
hedging with a short futures contract. Thus, it is the producersarbitrage technology that
forces there to be a common component in the spot and futures risk premium, which is why
the basis is not a good proxy for the futures risk premium (see Fama and French (1986)).
This contradicts a central tenet of the Theory of Normal Backwardation (Keynes (1936)), as
the forward curve is not downward sloping in the model even though there is a positive risk
premium required for holding long futures positions. We empirically verify the existence of
a common component in the spot and futures risk premiums later in the paper.
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Derivation of the basis. Add  times the FOC over futures to the FOC over inventory:
S0   E [S1] +  (E [S1]  F ) = E [(S1   S0) ~g (X; )] + + E [ (F   S1) ~g (X; )]
= (F   S0)E [~g (X; )] + 
+
S0   F = 
1 + E [~g (X; )]
+
F =
1

S0   1


1 + E [~g (X; )]
+
S0   F =

1  1


S0 +
1


1 + E [~g (X; )]
(79)
Finally, the basis normalized by the current spot price is then
S0   F
S0
= 1  1

+
1

=S0
1 + E [~g (X; )]
: (80)
as given in the text.
Finally we show that the variable  indeed can be thought of as measuring the funda-
mental hedging demand. In particular, the marginal benet of an additional unit of internal
funds is increasing in ;i.e. d~g(X;)
d
> 0, as shown below.
Proof. First, ~g (X; ) = g0 (X)  1. Then
d~g (X; )
d
= g00 (X)
dX
d
: (81)
Let u (X () ; ) = g (X)   X   C (X   w), which for each state w is concave in X by
assumption. This function is optimized for each  and therefore the derivative with respect
to  of its rst derivative with respect to X, must be zero: @
2u
@X2
dX
d
+ @
2u
@X@
= 0. Since @
2u
@X2
< 0,
sign
 
dX
d

= sign

@2u
@X@

. @u
@X
= g0 (X)   1   C 0 (e), so @2u
@X@
=  C 0 (e). Since C 0 (e) > 0,
we have that dX
d
< 0: Since g00 < 0 by assumption, we have that d~g(X;)
d
= g00 (X) dX

d
> 0.

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7.2.4 Assumptions on Market Incompleteness
This model assumes that producers are risk-neutral. An alternative specication would have
producers maximizing the value of the rm given a general stochastic discount factor which
also is a valid stochastic discount factor for the futures payo¤. Hedging would in this case not
be costly in terms of decreasing rm value even if the futures risk premium is positive. This
is because hedging of cash ow risk would decrease rm risk proportionately, since rm cash
ows are priced by the same stochastic discount factor as the futures cash ow. Therefore,
the optimal solution is to simply minimize the cost associated with C () by hedging fully
in the sense that Cov (S1; ~g (X; )) = 0. Time-variation in hedging demand would then
not a¤ect inventory decisions as complete hedging makes the inventory rst order condition
orthogonal to variations in the marginal benet of internal funds.
In other words, we are implicitly assuming that there is a degree of market separation
between commodity markets and the markets valuing the rm. A key assumption for time-
varying hedging demand to a¤ect production decisions is that hedging is costly to the rm,
or at least to the manager. Time-variation in the marginal benet of hedging will then be
mirrored in the marginal cost of hedging in equilibrium, which is the channel through which
producershedging demand a¤ects the futures risk premium.
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Table I 
Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, and the first autocorrelation coefficient AR(1)) of the 
variables AVGZm (cross-sectional average quarterly Zmijewski-score); AVG3Y (cross-sectional average of the time-
series average stock return per producer-firm over the past three years, each quarter); cross-sectional average naïve EDF 
(expected default frequency) from Bharath and Shumway (2008); basis (standard deviation and AR(1) computed for the 
deseasonalized series); spot returns; futures excess returns; net change in hedger’s short positions and the change in 
aggregate inventory (standard deviation and AR(1) computed for the deseasonalized series), all measured quarterly as 
specified in the Data section.  These statistics are computed for each of Crude Oil, Heating Oil, Gasoline and Natural 
Gas.    
 
  Crude Oil Heating Oil Gasoline Natural Gas 
     
AVGZm     
Mean -2.689 -2.727 -2.692 -2.587 
StdDev 0.318 0.323 0.329 0.417 
AR(1) 0.951 0.939 0.969 0.702 
AVG3Y     
Mean 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.004 
StdDev 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.013 
AR(1) 0.930 0.930 0.953 0.923 
Naïve EDF     
Mean 0.037 0.040 0.036 0.099 
StdDev 0.030 0.032 0.029 0.073 
AR(1) 0.726 0.743 0.719 0.829 
Basis     
Mean 0.018 0.026 0.040 -0.039 
StdDev 0.059 0.131 0.081 0.136 
AR(1) 0.462 0.146 0.390 0.342 
Spot Return     
Mean 0.031 0.033 0.039 0.042 
StdDev 0.170 0.179 0.175 0.226 
AR(1) -0.132 -0.143 -0.137 -0.194 
Futures Excess Return     
Mean 0.043 0.044 0.067 0.025 
StdDev 0.206 0.200 0.210 0.298 
AR(1) -0.123 -0.078 -0.183 0.035 
Hedgers Net Position     
Mean 0.003 0.080 0.069 0.067 
StdDev 0.072 0.114 0.099 0.068 
AR(1) 0.135 -0.010 0.256 0.206 
Change in Inventory     
Mean -0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.004 
StdDev 0.044 0.088 0.035 0.156 
AR(1) 0.551 0.506 0.138 0.415 
Table II 
Futures Excess Returns and Producer Default Risk 
 
This table presents results from univariate and multivariate forecasting regressions for futures excess returns for Crude 
Oil, Heating Oil, Gasoline and Natural Gas, as well as a ‘Joint Test’, i.e., a pooled regression of all four commodities.  
Panel A shows the results when the forecasting regressions have only the (lagged) default risk measures on the right-
hand side (as well as four quarterly dummy variables), and Panel B shows the results when the forecasting regressions 
incorporate controls in addition to the default risk measures.  These controls (all lagged one quarter) are: the spread of 
BAA over AAA rated corporate bonds; the equity market payout ratio; cay, a proxy for the aggregate consumption-
wealth ratio (Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)); the change in aggregate inventory; and the basis.  All standard errors are 
given below coefficients.  For the commodity-specific regressions, these are computed employing the Newey-West 
(1983) correction for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of up to 3 quarterly lags.  For the joint tests, we use Rogers 
(1983, 1993) robust standard errors, which correct for heteroskedasticity, and all autocorrelations and cross-correlations 
of up to 3 quarterly lags. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are reported in bold. 
 
Panel A: Forecasting Regressions, Univariate 
Excess Returns Crude Oil Heating Oil Gasoline Natural Gas Joint Test 
      
AVG3Y(-1) -2.960 -3.645 -3.369 -5.801 -0.150 
 1.352 1.300 2.066 3.137 0.070 
R-squared 0.087 0.086 0.072 0.079 0.068 
N(Observations) 91 108 84 64 347 
      
AVGZM(-1) 0.106 0.108 0.076 0.132 0.053 
 0.044 0.039 0.058 0.100 0.042 
R-squared 0.094 0.081 0.062 0.050 0.049 
N(Observations) 91 108 84 64 347 
      
Naïve EDF(-1) 1.294 0.870 1.909 0.223 0.164 
 0.569 0.460 0.506 0.440 0.055 
R-squared 0.101 0.063 0.115 0.020 0.062 
N(Observations) 77 93 70 50 290 
      
Controls? No No No No No 
Quarterly Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Forecasting Regressions, With Controls 
Excess Returns Crude Oil Heating Oil Gasoline Natural Gas Joint Test 
      
AVG3Y(-1) -5.597 -4.410 -4.263 -7.227 -0.207 
 1.905 1.292 1.953 2.888 0.064 
R-squared 0.145 0.129 0.162 0.121 0.104 
N(Observations) 91 108 84 64 347 
  
AVGZM(-1) 0.188 0.156 0.123 0.114 0.113 
 0.052 0.038 0.059 0.103 0.045 
R-squared 0.152 0.134 0.158 0.069 0.084 
N(Observations) 91 108 84 64 347 
      
Naïve EDF(-1) 1.407 0.749 1.985 -0.426 0.144 
 0.656 0.517 0.480 0.520 0.063 
R-squared 0.136 0.098 0.209 0.080 0.074 
N(Observations) 77 93 70 50 290 
      
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Table III 
Spot Returns and Producer Default Risk 
 
This table presents results from univariate and multivariate forecasting regressions for spot returns for Crude Oil, 
Heating Oil, Gasoline and Natural Gas, as well as a ‘Joint Test’, i.e., a pooled regression of all four commodities.  Panel 
A shows the results when the forecasting regressions have only the (lagged) default risk measures on the right-hand side 
(as well as four quarterly dummy variables), and Panel B shows the results when the forecasting regressions incorporate 
controls in addition to the default risk measures.  These controls (all lagged one quarter) are: the spread of BAA over 
AAA rated corporate bonds; the equity market payout ratio; cay, a proxy for the aggregate consumption-wealth ratio 
(Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)); the change in aggregate inventory; and the basis.  All standard errors are given below 
coefficients.  For the commodity-specific regressions, these are computed employing the Newey-West (1983) correction 
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of up to 3 quarterly lags.  For the joint tests, we use Rogers (1983, 1993) 
robust standard errors, which correct for heteroskedasticity, and all autocorrelations and cross-correlations of up to 3 
quarterly lags. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are reported in bold. 
 
Panel A: Forecasting Regressions, Univariate 
Spot Returns Crude Oil Heating Oil Gasoline Natural Gas Joint Test 
      
AVG3Y(-1) -1.038 -0.678 -1.024 -3.680 -0.070 
 1.384 1.167 1.614 2.636 0.066 
R-squared 0.073 0.111 0.163 0.082 0.054 
N(Observations) 91 108 88 64 351 
      
AVGZM(-1) 0.048 0.037 0.041 0.098 0.051 
 0.046 0.039 0.052 0.070 0.053 
R-squared 0.075 0.114 0.165 0.074 0.042 
N(Observations) 91 108 88 64 351 
      
Naïve EDF(-1) 0.954 0.659 1.508 0.385 0.148 
 0.560 0.468 0.498 0.355 0.055 
R-squared 0.090 0.136 0.196 0.049 0.066 
N(Observations) 77 93 74 50 294 
      
Controls? No No No No No 
Quarterly Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Forecasting Regressions, With Controls 
Spot Returns Crude Oil Heating Oil Gasoline Natural Gas Joint Test 
      
AVG3Y(-1) -4.879 -2.501 -3.012 -6.120 -0.164 
 1.915 1.196 1.625 2.566 0.060 
R-squared 0.219 0.198 0.233 0.158 0.148 
N(Observations) 91 108 88 64 351 
      
AVGZM(-1) 0.160 0.101 0.118 0.082 0.107 
 0.047 0.040 0.047 0.088 0.034 
R-squared 0.223 0.204 0.243 0.114 0.140 
N(Observations) 91 108 88 64 351 
      
Naïve EDF(-1) 1.202 0.597 1.465 -0.356 0.120 
 0.592 0.454 0.477 0.440 0.062 
R-squared 0.217 0.208 0.219 0.141 0.138 
N(Observations) 77 93 74 50 294 
      
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Table IV 
Hedger Net Short Positions and Producer Default Risk 
 
This table presents results from univariate and multivariate forecasting regressions for Hedger Net Short Positions 
(HedgerShort(t)-HedgerLong(t)/(HedgerShort(t-1)+HedgerLong(t-1)), data from CFTC) for Crude Oil, Heating Oil, 
Gasoline and Natural Gas, as well as a ‘Joint Test’, i.e., a pooled regression of all four commodities.  Panel A shows the 
results when the forecasting regressions have only the (lagged) default risk measures on the right-hand side (as well as 
four quarterly dummy variables), and Panel B shows the results when the forecasting regressions incorporate controls in 
addition to the default risk measures.  These controls (all lagged one quarter) are: the spread of BAA over AAA rated 
corporate bonds; the equity market payout ratio; cay, a proxy for the aggregate consumption-wealth ratio (Lettau and 
Ludvigson (2001)); the change in aggregate inventory; and the basis.  All standard errors are given below coefficients.  
For the commodity-specific regressions, these are computed employing the Newey-West (1983) correction for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of up to 3 quarterly lags.  For the joint tests, we use Rogers (1983, 1993) robust 
standard errors, which correct for heteroskedasticity, and all autocorrelations and cross-correlations of up to 3 quarterly 
lags. Coefficients significant at the 10% level are reported in bold. 
 
Panel A: Forecasting Regressions, Univariate 
Hedger Net Short Positions Crude Oil Heating Oil Gasoline Natural Gas Joint Test 
      
AVG3Y(-1) -0.211 -0.590 0.283 -0.278 -0.118 
 0.200 0.243 0.236 0.164 0.070 
R-squared 0.078 0.237 0.238 0.137 0.074 
N(Observations) 79 91 82 52 304 
      
AVGZM(-1) 0.016 0.030 -0.006 0.011 0.091 
 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.036 
R-squared 0.120 0.286 0.233 0.149 0.089 
N(Observations) 79 91 82 52 304 
      
Naïve EDF(-1) 0.148 0.153 0.174 -0.001 0.192 
 0.065 0.060 0.056 0.027 0.051 
R-squared 0.143 0.286 0.281 0.081 0.100 
N(Observations) 69 81 72 42 264 
  
Controls? No No No No No 
Quarterly Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Forecasting Regressions, With Controls 
Hedger Net Short Positions Crude Oil Heating Oil Gasoline Natural Gas Joint Test 
      
AVG3Y(-1) -0.315 -0.744 -0.062 -0.521 -0.164 
 0.245 0.251 0.239 0.163 0.070 
R-squared 0.120 0.290 0.347 0.313 0.151 
N(Observations) 79 91 82 52 304 
      
AVGZM(-1) 0.025 0.040 0.005 0.017 0.161 
 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.041 
R-squared 0.197 0.353 0.349 0.310 0.184 
N(Observations) 79 91 82 52 304 
      
Naïve EDF(-1) 0.130 0.167 0.141 -0.001 0.141 
 0.069 0.063 0.059 0.024 0.033 
R-squared 0.153 0.333 0.333 0.279 0.147 
N(Observations) 69 81 72 42 264 
      
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table V 
Changes in Inventory and Producer Default Risk 
 
This table presents results from univariate and multivariate regressions to explain the change in Inventory (Inventory – 
Trend(Inventory)) for Crude Oil, Heating Oil, Gasoline and Natural Gas, as well as a ‘Joint Test’, i.e., a pooled 
regression of all four commodities.  Panel A shows the results when the regressions have only the (lagged) default risk 
measures on the right-hand side (as well as four quarterly dummy variables), and Panel B shows the results when the 
regressions incorporate controls in addition to the default risk measures.  These controls (all lagged one quarter) are: the 
spread of BAA over AAA rated corporate bonds; the equity market payout ratio; cay, a proxy for the aggregate 
consumption-wealth ratio (Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)); four lags of the change in aggregate inventory; the mean GDP 
and Industrial Production growth forecasts (for the current quarter) from the survey of professional forecasters at the 
Philadelphia Fed; and the basis.  All standard errors are given below coefficients.  For the commodity-specific 
regressions, these are computed employing the Newey-West (1983) correction for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
of up to 3 quarterly lags.  For the joint tests, we use Rogers (1983, 1993) robust standard errors, which correct for 
heteroskedasticity, and all autocorrelations and cross-correlations of up to 3 quarterly lags. Coefficients significant at the 
10% level are reported in bold. 
Panel A: Regressions, Univariate 
Change in Inventory  Crude Oil Heating Oil Gasoline Natural Gas Joint Test 
      
AVG3Y(-1) 1.538 2.051 0.330 0.163 0.128 
 0.351 1.063 0.387 1.271 0.046 
R-squared 0.303 0.648 0.064 0.850 0.090 
N(Observations) 91 108 88 64 351 
      
AVGZM(-1) -0.027 -0.025 0.003 0.095 -0.025 
 0.017 0.035 0.010 0.045 0.026 
R-squared 0.247 0.630 0.057 0.860 0.074 
N(Observations) 91 108 88 64 351 
      
Naïve EDF(-1) -0.333 -0.698 -0.113 0.721 -0.103 
 0.273 0.412 0.175 0.185 0.118 
R-squared 0.227 0.661 0.045 0.852 0.082 
N(Observations) 77 93 74 50 294 
      
Controls? No No No No No 
Quarterly Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B: Regressions, With Controls 
Change in Inventory Crude Oil Heating Oil Gasoline Natural Gas Joint Test 
      
AVG3Y(-1) 0.898 0.830 0.131 -1.190 0.124 
 0.403 0.762 0.389 1.371 0.058 
R-squared 0.544 0.748 0.211 0.916 0.368 
N(Observations) 91 108 88 64 351 
      
AVGZM(-1) -0.011 0.007 0.003 0.125 -0.044 
 0.013 0.028 0.012 0.036 0.029 
R-squared 0.526 0.746 0.210 0.924 0.358 
N(Observations) 91 108 88 64 351 
      
Naïve EDF(-1) -0.225 -0.683 -0.425 0.456 -0.203 
 0.138 0.346 0.151 0.186 0.102 
R-squared 0.528 0.765 0.268 0.930 0.377 
N(Observations) 77 93 74 50 294 
  
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Figure 1 
 
Figure 1: This figure shows how futures and spot prices change in response to an increase in fundamental hedging 
demand (ܽ௣෦) in the case of no inventory stock-out. The solid lines denote equilibrium values before the change. Here the 
basis before the change is noted on the vertical axis: Basis = S0 – F. The dashed lines denote equilibrium values with 
higher hedging demand. 
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Figure 2 
 
Figure 2: This figure shows how futures and spot prices change in response to an increase in fundamental hedging 
demand (ܽ௣෦) in the case of an inventory stock-out. The solid lines denote equilibrium values before the change. Here the 
basis before the change is noted on the vertical axis: Basis = S0 – F. The dashed lines denote equilibrium values with 
higher hedging demand. 
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Figure 3 
 
Figure 3: The figure plots the default risk measures (AVG3Y, AVGZm and Naïve EDF) for Crude Oil, Heating Oil and Gasoline (the series used for all three 
commodities are the same, since the producer firms are in the same SIC classification codes).  The series are normalized by subtracting their means and dividing by 
their standard deviations for ease of plotting. 
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Figure 4 
 
Figure 4: The figure plots the default risk measures (AVG3Y, AVGZm and Naïve EDF) for Natural Gas producers.  The series are normalized by subtracting their 
means and dividing by their standard deviations for ease of plotting. 
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